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(1) Did the court of special appeals 
misapply Batson v. Kentucky to the 
circumstances of this case? 
(2) Can Gorman assert a sixth 
amendment claim of fair cross-sec-
tion deprivation in the composition 
of his jury? 
(3) Did the court of special appeals 
err in mandating a new trial? 
[d. at 413-14,554 A.2d at 1208. 
Regarding the first question, the court 
considered the applicability of Batson to 
the facts before it. Batson, which in-
volved the state exercising its peremp-
tory challenges to strike black jurors 
from the trial of a black man, created a 
three-part evidentiary standard that a de-
fendant must meet in order to establish a 
prima facie case of purposeful discrimi-
nation in petit jury selection: 1) defen-
dant must establish that he is a member 
of a cognizable racial group and that the 
prosecution has used peremptory chal-
lenges to strike members of the same race 
from venire; 2) the defendant may rely on 
the fact that peremptory challenges per-
mit discrimination by those who desire to 
discriminate in their selection of a petit 
jury; and 3) defendant must show that 
these facts and any other circumstances 
surrounding the jury selection raise an 
inference that the state used their per-
emptory challenges to strike veniremen 
from the petit jury because of their race. 
[d. at 410, 554 A.2d at 1207 (relying on 
Batson 476 U.S. at 96). 
The Gorman court held that the court 
of special appeals had misapplied the 
Batson standard as that holding did not 
include situations where the jurors 
struck were not the same race as the 
defendant. Gorman, 315 Md. at 414-16, 
554 A.2d at 1208-10. Furthermore, the 
circumstances in Gorman failed to meet 
the first prong of the Batson evidentiary 
standard. Gorman was not a member of 
a cognizable racial group, nor were the 
jurors who were struck the same race as 
Gorman. [d. at 416, 554A.2d at 1209-10. 
Next, the court rejected Gorman's con-
tention that the state's exercise of per-
emptory challenges violated his constitu-
tional right to due process of law. Al-
though Gorman relied on Peters v. Ki/f, 
407 U.S. 493 (1972) for support, the 
court noted that Peters involved due 
process because the jury had been ille-
gally composed, not because of any mis-
use of peremptory challenges. There-
fore, the court concluded that the state's 
use of peremptory challenges in Gor-
man's case did not rise to the level of a 
due process violation. Gorman, 315 Md. 
at 417, 554A.2d at 1210. 
Similarly, the court rejected Gorman's 
sixth amendment claim of fair cross-sec-
tion deprivation; first, because the Bat-
son Court had ignored a similar claim; 
and second, because the later case of 
Lockbartv. McCree, 476U.S. 162 (1986) 
expressly rejected the notion that the fair 
cross-section guarantee of the sixth 
amendment applied to peremptory 
challenges. Gorman at 417-19,554 A.2d 
at 1210-11. 
Regarding the issue of whether the 
lower court erred in mandating a new 
trial, the court stated that the question 
would only arise if in fact Batson applied 
to the facts of Gorman's case. Since the 
court previously determined that Batson 
did not apply, it was not necessary to 
consider the question. [d. at 420, 554 
A.2d at 1211. Thus, the court of appeals 
reversed the decision of the court of 
special appeals, finding no constitu-
tional violations from the state's exercise 
of its peremptory challenges. 
In a lengthy dissent, Judge Eldridge 
opined that the actions of the state in this 
case did constitute a prima facie case of 
purposeful discrimination in violation of 
the equal protection clause, and there-
fore, required the prosecution to pro-
vide an explanation for its conduct. [d. at 
420-23, 554 A.2d at 1212-13. He also 
believed that both Gorman's fourteenth 
amendment due process rights and his 
sixth amendment right to an impartial 
jury had been violated, that the "same 
class" rule (the first step of the Batson 
evidentiary test) was inconsistent with 
equal protection ofthe law (as it applies 
to race discrimination), and that Gorman 
had standing to challenge the racial dis-
crimination in the selection ofthe petit 
jury in his case, based on the rationale of 
Peters [d. at 423-38, 554A.2d at 1213-21. 
In the dissent's view, the state's use of 
peremptory challenges to strike persons 
from a petit jury solely because of their 
race should shift the evidentiary burden 
to the state to prove othetwise. [d. at 438, 
554 A.2d at 1220-21. 
The Gorman decision is Significant as 
it illustrates Maryland's refusal to extend 
the holding of Batson beyond the spe-
cific factual scenario in Batson. The con-
sequences are: 1) the unconditional 
nature of the peremptory challenge as it 
has historically existed is preserved; and 
2) white criminal defendants in Maryland 
are now precluded from asserting dis-
crimination when the state uses its per-
emptory challenges to strike black veni-
remen. Conversely, the state remains 
free to strike blacks from the jury panel in 
any criminal trial where the defendant is 
not black. 
-Gregory}. Swain 
Nelson v. State: TRlALJUDGE'S 
REFUSAL TO ALLOW PRESENTENCE 
INVESTIGATION IN A SERIOUS 
NONCAPITAL CASE, IN TIlE 
ABSENCE OF SOUND REASON, IS 
ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
In Nelson v. State, 315 Md. 62, 553 
A.2d 667 (1989), the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland held that the trial court's re-
fusal to order a presentence investiga-
tion report in a serious noncapital case, 
without giving a sound reason why the 
investigation should not be made, was an 
abuse of discretion. 
The defendant, Michael B. Nelson, was 
convicted of first degree murder in the 
Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Follow-
ing pronouncement of the verdict, Nel-
son requested that the court order a 
presentence investigation under Md. 
Ann. Code art, 41, §4-609 (1986 & Supp. 
1988), before imposing sentence. Al-
though the state had no objection to the 
investigation, the sentencing judge re-
fused. The court's reasoning was that 
such investigations were costly and 
would not be ordered without a showing 
of particular need. 
On the date of the dispoSition, Nelson 
again requested a presentence investiga-
tion, arguing that, because the court has 
the discretion to suspend any part of a life 
sentence, the court was obligated to 
learn as much as possible about the de-
fendant in order to impose a fair sen-
tence. The court again refused and im-
posed a life sentence and two consecu-
tive one-year sentences. The Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland subse-
quently affirmed the judgments and 
sentencing. The only issue before the 
court of appeals was whether the trial 
court erred in refusing to order a presen-
tence investigation. 
The court of appeals began its analysis 
by turning to Md. Ann. Code art. 41, §4-
609(b) which requires agents of the Divi-
sion of Parole and Probation to provide 
the court with presentence reports or 
other investigations in all cases when 
requested by any judge. Section 4-609 
(c)(l) provides: 
Prior to the sentence by the circuit 
court of any county to the jurisdic-
tion of the Division of Correction of 
a defendant convicted of a felony, or 
a misdemeanor which resulted in 
serious physical injury or death to 
the victim, or the referral of any 
defendant to the Patuxent Institu-
tion, a presentence investigation 
shall be completed by the Division 
of Parole and Probation and consid-
ered by the court, unless the court 
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specifically orders to the contrary in 
a particular case. 
Seeking to ascertain the legislative in-
tent of section 4-609, the court made an 
extensive review of the statute's legisla-
tive history. The court found that presen-
tence investigations were first addressed 
in 1953 Md. Laws, ch. 625, which pro-
vided that the Board of Parole and Proba-
tion would be available to the judges of 
the circuit courts "for the purpose of 
making presentence or other investiga-
tions" requested by the court. 
In 1968, the statute was expanded to 
include judges of any court of limited 
criminal jurisdiction, "including, but not 
limited to the Municipal Court of Balti-
more City, any people's court or any trial 
magistrate, . . . in all cases which may 
include commitment for two or more 
years .... "Md. Ann. Code art. 41 §124 
(Supp. 1968). 1972 Md. Laws, ch. 532 
made presentencing investigations avail-
able in cases where the commitment was 
for less than two years, and present sub-
section (c) was added in 1976. In 1982, 
misdemeanors were added to the list of 
crimes entitling a defendant to an inves-
tigation and, in 1983, the investigation 
was made mandatory in any case in which 
the death penalty was requested. In 
1987, the requirement for a presen-
tencing report was further extended to 
include cases where imprisonment for 
life without a possibility of parole is re-
quested. 
Reading the plain language of section 
4-609 in the context of the legislative his-
tory of the statute, the court of appeals 
determined that the statute reflected an 
obvious legislative preference for the use 
of presentence investigation reports, 
and determined that to overcome the 
presumption in favor of these reports, a 
court must have a valid reason, particular 
to the facts of a given case, for refusing to 
order an investigation. The court reiter-
ated that a presentence report in capital 
cases is mandatory. In all cases falling 
within subsection (c) (1), the presen-
tencing report also must be prepared 
and considered, unless the court orders 
to the contrary. 
The court observed that a trial judge is 
vested with broad discretionary powers, 
including the power to fashion an appro-
priate sentence. The court noted how-
ever, that this discretion is limited. This 
judicial discretion must be reflected in 
the record, and it must not be arbitrary or 
capricious, otherwise, the court's action 
is erroneous. Nelson, 315 Md. at 70, 553 
A.2d at 671. 
In the case sub judice, the trial judge 
refused to order an investigation, be-
cause: 1) there had been no showing that 
there was anything pertaining to the de-
fendant's background that the defense 
lawyer himself could not have devel-
oped; and 2) the process was costly. The 
court of appeals rejected both reasons. 
In the court's view, placing the burden 
on defense counsel to point out with 
specificity, to the satisfaction of the 
judge, that a presentence investigation 
should be ordered was clearly contrary to 
the statute. Under section 4-609 the 
burden is on the judge to show why an in-
vestigation should not be conducted. 
The trial judge's belief that the issue of 
cost was relevant to ordering an investi-
gation had no basis in either the language 
or the history of the statute. Nelson, 315 
Md. at 71-72,553 A.2d at 671-72. 
According to the court of appeals, the 
trial judge had required his own condi-
tions to be met before a presentence 
investigation would be ordered: an ini-
tial investigation by defense counsel, the 
uncovering of a fact requiring additional 
explanation, and a finding that the fact to 
be explained was relevant to the imposi-
tion of a fair sentence. Thus, the trial 
court's denial of the presentence investi-
gation was an abuse of discretion. The 
court of appeals reversed the judgment 
of the court of special appeals to the 
extent that the sentence imposed by the 
Circuit Court for Baltimore City was af-
firmed, and remanded the case for resen-
tencing with the benefit of a presentence 
investigation report. 
The decision inNelson is an attempt to 
accommodate two significant interests: 
the interest in fair sentencing based on 
the best available information, and the 
interest in historic deference to judicial 
discretion. In holding that presentence 
investigations in serious noncapital cases 
are required, unless the judge provides 
adequate reasons to support a denial, the 
court severely restricted the trial judge's 
discretionary power in this area. 
-Suzanne R. Cohn 
Texas v. Johnson: FlAG-BURNING 
AS PROTEST PROTECTED 
WITHIN CONTEXT OF FIRST 
AMENDMENT 
In Texas v.Johnson, 491 U.S. _, 109 
S. Ct. 2533 (1989), the United States 
Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held 
that the conviction of a protestor for 
burning an American flag as part of a 
political demonstration violated the first 
amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 
The Republican National Convention 
was held in Dallas, Texas in 1984. A 
political demonstration took place in the 
city streets during the convention. The 
demonstration was staged to protest the 
policies of the Reagan Administration, 
the nomination of President Reagan for 
reelection and the activities of several 
Dallas-based corporations. The protest 
culminated at the Dallas City Hall where 
Gregory Lee Johnson poured kerosene 
on an American flag and set it ablaze. 
Although the protestors chanted anti-
American slogans over the burning flag, 
they did not threaten or injure any by-
standers. 
Johnson was charged and convicted 
under a Texas statute of desecrating a 
venerated object. His conviction was 
affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth District of Texas. However, the 
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals re-
versed, holding that johnson's actions 
were the equivalent of symbolic speech 
and were protected by the first amend-
ment. The state argued that two separate 
interests supported Johnson's convic-
tion: "preserving the flag as a symbol of 
national unity and preventing breaches 
of the peace."Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2537. 
The court of criminal appeals rejected· 
the state's arguments on both points. It 
noted that although the Supreme Court 
had not yet decided whether a state could 
criminalize flag-burning to protect the 
symbolic value of the flag, a government 
could not impose upon its citizens beliefs 
or messages associated with a symbol of 
unity and that the first amendment pro-
tects differences of opinion with respect 
to such symbols. [d. The Texas court also 
believed thatJohnson's conduct did not 
seriously threaten the status of the flag 
nor did it lessen the flag's symbolic value. 
[d. 
Pertaining to the second interest, the 
court of criminal appeals noted that the 
desecration statute was not limited in 
scope to punishing only those acts that 
were likely to result in breaches of the 
peace and also pointed out that 
johnson's actions, while offensive to 
most, were not likely to (and in fact did 
not) cause a breach of the peace. Addi-
tionally, the court noted that Texas had 
another statute that specifically ad-
dressed breaches of the peace, and if the 
state was truly interested in punishing 
Johnson for this reason it could have 
done so without punishing him for flag-
burning. Since the court found the dese-
cration statute to be unconstitutional as 
applied, it did not reach the issue of 
whether the statute was facially 
unconstitutional. [d. at 2537-38. 
The United States Supreme Court also 
chose to resolve the case on an "as ap-
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